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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to investigate the connection between local development projects
and the residents’ social capital in Bohol, The Philippines. From this perspective, we hypothesized
that social behaviors of local farmers are influenced by the availability of canal irrigation due to
the collective water management required in irrigated societies. By combining the results of the
ultimatum game (UG) with a household survey on 245 villagers in Bohol, this paper (1) measures
the degree of social capital at the individual level and (2) quantifies the effects of irrigation on social
capital by controlling household as well as individual characteristics. Moreover, we employed a
Spatial Autoregressive model to explore the spatial effects and social contexts of farmers’ behavioral
patterns. The empirical results show that the level of measured social behavior is strongly associated
with access to community irrigation water and asset holdings. Additionally, increased physical
distance between residents leads to a decrease in social capital, or interdependency, among them.
The results suggest that community engagement (e.g., irrigation management committee and turnout
service association) with local development projects would not only improve agricultural productivity
but also enhance social relationships among farmers, highlighting its importance.
Keywords: local development; behavioral experiment; spatial autoregressive model; social capital;
community engagement; ultimatum game
1. Introduction
Over the past 50 years, Official Development Assistance (ODA)—international aid for economic
development and welfare provided by multinational agencies [1]—has been continuously implemented
in developing countries. In particular, during the 1970s, international aid agencies and donor countries
recognized the dangers of unbalanced economic development in developing countries and began
employing local development projects, which aimed to improve the livelihoods of those suffering
from economic and societal difficulties in selected areas. Considering that nearly 1.2 billion people
and 75% of the destitute poor work in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries across the globe [2], local
development projects associated with the primary sector of the recipient can be efficient policy making
tools to enhance these living conditions [3]. Many studies have focused on the impact assessment of
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ODA projects regarding aid effectiveness. Despite the rising number of impact assessments, only a
few have empirically addressed the social impacts of these projects on residents [4]. Even so, for the
past several decades, many researchers and activists have realized significant social changes by local
development projects through participation and cooperative activities [5].
We employed the concept of social capital to scrutinize the social impact and changes brought
forth by local development projects. The early definition of social capital is discussed by Putnam [6]
and Coleman [7]. Putnam [5] defined social capital as features of a social organization that facilitate
mutual benefits. Coleman [6] described social capital as an informal social network among stakeholders
pursuing their economic benefits within close social bonds. Later, a large volume of literature discussed
the close linkages between local economic development and social capital (i.e., effective cooperation
through people’s voluntary behaviors and co-operative interaction) [6–11]. In particular, Bowles and
Gintis [10] attempted to argue that social capital (e.g., social norms, trust, and punishment among
people belonging to communities or groups) is a means to solve market failure in a capitalist society.
While social capital analysis is meaningful for assessing the social impact of local development
projects, quantitative evidence of how social capital is related to local development is relatively
scarce. The lack of evidence owes to the broad definition of social capital, which leads to difficulty in
quantitatively measuring its value. In response to these limitations, various scholars have attempted
to use several innovative methods. Particularly, in development studies, Baud et al. [12] implemented
a percentage of socially disadvantaged groups in a sample population to indicate the deprivation
of social capital. Mitra [13] used urban immigrants’ residence period as social capital to verify the
relationship between social capital and the informal job network. More so, Baud et al. [11] and
Mitra [12] attempted to capture social capital within neighborhoods (i.e., communities sharing similar
geographical and/or social environment), leaving room for a more rigorous quantitative analysis of
social capital. To add further perspective, we propose measuring social capital to reveal its relationship
to an irrigation project and its beneficiaries. In light of the importance of public participation in
local development projects [14,15], it is essential to quantify the social capital of the beneficiaries to
understand the social impact of the irrigation project.
A relatively large number of studies have investigated social capital in regards to irrigation
schemes [16–18]. Since water management and regulation is vital to enhancing productivity on
agricultural lands, much research has focused on the importance of structural social capital—i.e., social
norms and regulation in irrigation management [16,17]. However, while social capital can be measured
and implemented in diverse perspectives, such as institutional [19,20] and transplanted community
structures [17,21], many studies have focused on how social capital impacts irrigation schemes rather
than vice versa. Hence, research focusing on the accumulation of social capital under an irrigation
scheme at the stakeholder level is scarce [16]. Empirical evidence is required to fully understand the
impact of an irrigation scheme on the formation of social capital. In this study, we employ a behavioral
experiment to explore this empirical evidence.
Behavioral experiments, which have been developed by behavioral economists since 1960, are key
instruments to measure social capital in this study. In the early stages of behavioral economics,
researchers did not pay attention to the anomalies and the meanings of the players’ payoff; rather, they
assumed that players aimed to maximize their benefits and minimize their costs out of self-interest [22].
Follow-up experiments, however, revealed that anomalies were related to the players’ perception of
fairness [23]; that is, a player’s consideration of fairness and retaliation under the various institutional
environments shape their behavior [24]. Given this context, game theory and behavioral experiments
have been employed by several scholars [24–28] to measure social capital. In summary, these
studies have revealed that the self-interest model failed to confirm the assumption of individual
selfishness [24]. In particular, players exhibit more altruistic behavior toward a known rather than
an unknown counterpart [26], meaning that people who have strong relations within neighborhoods
exhibit pro-social behavior to a greater extent.
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Our research is intended to quantitatively examine whether and to what extent the execution of
collective common resource management affects the farmers’ behavioral patterns. Within our study
site in the Philippines, the Bayongan irrigation system, an irrigation canal, was constructed under
the support by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in 2008. Prior to construction,
the irrigated and non-irrigated (rainfed) areas were adjacent and had shared the same cultural,
agroecological, and economic environments. Due to an unexpected funding shortage, irrigation
was not introduced into the rainfed areas during the project period. Therefore, the irrigation scheme
can be treated as a random (non-selective) and an exogenous intervention experiment. In addition
to experimental irrigation, our study incorporates a unique blend of two notable features. First,
we employ a behavioral experiment known as an ultimatum game (UG), which enables us to quantify
the farmers’ social capital. Second, we employ spatial econometrics to control for the spatial spillover
of social capital among neighboring farmers; this process is essential when addressing the possible
estimation bias that arises from not modeling the spillover [23]. Additionally, our interpretation of
statistical results was supported by semi-structured interviews of selected residents, which illuminates
the local context of societal changes contingent to the irrigation scheme. With these methodologies,
we hypothesized that: (1) farmers have different levels of social capital; and that (2) community
engagement activities, when linked to the collective management of an irrigation system, would foster
the farmers’ pro-social behaviors.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Study Area
Our target area lies in Bohol Province in the central region of the Philippines (Figure 1). The study
focuses on the Bayongan Irrigation System, located in the northeastern part of Bohol Island (about
50 km from the provincial capital city of Tagbilaran), which began operation in May 2008. The total
service area covers approximately 3295 ha of agricultural land. The total lengths of the main canal,
sub-canals, and sub-lateral canals are 17.5 km, 32.9 km and 6309 km, respectively. The irrigation canals
span three municipalities—San Miguel, Trinidad, and Ubay—which are divided into 18 barangays.
A barangay is the smallest administrative division in the Philippines, which is the subdivision of
municipality. The Bayongan local development projects planned and granted by JICA financially
supported this irrigation system. Unlike previous irrigation projects in the Philippines, the concrete
canals with metal-based water gates are able to prevent water leakage and random water abuse by
farmers. As discussed in the introduction, our sample farmers were chosen from both irrigated and
non-irrigated areas. Thus, our analysis employs the data on beneficiaries (farmers with irrigated
farmlands) and non-beneficiaries (farmers with rainfed farm lands).
As a way to effectively manage the collective use of the irrigation canals in the Bayongan Irrigation
Scheme, the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) formed multiple Irrigation Associations (IA)
and Turnout Service Areas (TSA) across the region that were established based on each lateral service
area (Figure 2). The IA committees consist of TSA leaders who use the irrigation scheme. Monthly
meetings facilitate communication among TSA leaders in regard to system maintenance and scheduled
water usage. Each TSA consists of about twenty farmers, whose responsibilities include management,
organization, and scheduling of water rotation among the fields within the group. This TSA structure
keeps farmers accountable to each other.
Water 2017, 9, 202 4 of 15Water 2017, 9, 202  4 of 15 
 
 
Figure 1. Study sites in Bohol province, the Philippines. 
 
Figure 2. Organizational structure of National Irrigation Administration (NIA), Irrigation 
Associations (IA) and Turnout Service Areas (TSA). 
2.2. Experimental Design 
The three empirical tools employed in this study include: (1) a behavioral experiment; (2) semi-
structured interviews; and (3) a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model. Since we aim to highlight the 
benefits of game experiments and SAR modeling when analyzing data that are likely to be spatially 
correlated, the semi-structured interview would be used as an auxiliary material. 
2.2.1. Behavioral Experiments 
Behavioral experiments are designed to quantify the participants’ social behavior under strategic 
situations [29]. Among a range of games to select, this study chose the ultimatum game (UG), which 
was developed to elicit the behavioral levels of tolerance or retaliation. We ran six-day workshops at 
the study sites to conduct UG in the National Irrigation Administration regional office and in 
community halls in August 2011. We collected results from 131 beneficiaries and 114 non-beneficiaries. 
Fig re 1. St y sites i o ol rovi ce, t e ili i es.
Water 2017, 9, 202  4 of 15 
 
 
Figure 1. Study sites in Bohol province, the Philippines. 
 
Figure 2. Organizational structure of National Irrigation Administration (NIA), Irrigation 
Associations (IA) and Turnout Service Areas (TSA). 
2.2. Experimental Design 
The three empirical tools employed in this study include: (1) a behavioral experiment; (2) semi-
structured interviews; and (3) a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model. Since we aim to highlight the 
benefits of game experiments and SAR modeling when analyzing data that are likely to be spatially 
correlated, the semi-structured interview would be used as an auxiliary material. 
2.2.1. Behavioral Experiments 
Behavioral experiments are designed to quantify the participants’ social behavior under strategic 
situations [29]. Among a range of games to select, this study chose the ultimatum game (UG), which 
was developed to elicit the behavioral levels of tolerance or retaliation. We ran six-day workshops at 
the study sites to conduct UG in the National Irrigation Administration regional office and in 
community halls in August 2011. We collected results from 131 beneficiaries and 114 non-beneficiaries. 
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(IA) and Turnout Service Areas (TSA).
2.2. Experimental Design
The three empirical tools employed in this study include: (1) a behavioral experiment;
(2) semi-structured interviews; and (3) a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model. Since we aim to highlight
the benefits of game experiments and SAR m deling when analyzing data that are likely to be spatially
correlated, the semi-structured interview would be used as an auxiliary material.
2.2.1. Behavioral Experiments
Behavioral experiments are designed to quantify the participants’ social behavior under strategic
situations [29]. Among a range of games to select, this study chose the ultimatum game (UG), which
was developed to elicit the behavioral levels of olerance or retaliation. We ran six-day workshops
at the study sites to conduct UG in the National Irrigation Adm nistration regional office and in
comm nity halls in August 2011. We collected results from 131 beneficiaries and 114 non-ben ficiaries.
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The experiments were conducted alongside local staff from the International Rice Research
Institute (IRRI) in English and Cebuano and were supervised by the IRRI Social Sciences Division
(SSD). While IRRI did not have an institutional review board during the study period, this work was
reviewed and approved through an internal review process by the head of the SSD. In addition, to meet
an ethical standard, we conducted experiments with only volunteer participants. All participants were
provided instructions prior to their participation and had the option to terminate the experiment at
any point. In addition, the enumerators sought and proceeded only upon consent at the beginning of
each interview. The Chief Information Officer of IRRI approved these procedures.
Participants required for an UG experiment to include a sender and receiver, both of who should be
anonymous. Given a certain endowment of money (i.e., 100 Philippine pesos (PhP) in this experiment),
the sender decides whether to transfer a discretionary amount to the receiver, who has the option
to accept or reject the transfer. Before the sender decides how much to transfer, the receiver sets a
minimum threshold that determines whether they will accept the monetary offer. If the monetary offer
is equal to or greater than the threshold, the receiver accepts the transfer and the transferred amount
becomes the receiver’s payoff. The remaining amount (i.e., equal to 100 PhP minus the offer) becomes
the sender’s payoff. However, if the transfer is rejected due to not reaching the threshold set by the
receiver, then both the sender and receiver end up with zero payoff. We recorded the threshold value
set by each receiver as an UG result. According to the rational choice theory [9,29], the optimal strategy
for the receiver is to accept any amount of transfer (i.e., the threshold being zero PhP). However, in the
real world, a receiver often sets a relatively high threshold that reflects behavioral levels of retaliation.
In an experiment by Sanfey et al. [30], over 50% of the receivers set the threshold below 20% of the total
endowment senders could offer. In addition, 62% of the senders sent more than 20% of the endowment
in the experiment by Hoffman et al. [27]. These results show that participants consider fair distribution.
Thus, the game can capture levels of altruism and retaliation among participants. One the one hand,
greater threshold values indicate a higher tendency to retaliate for an unfair distribution. On the other
hand, the smaller threshold values indicate a higher willingness to tolerate the level of distribution.
Therefore, the recorded threshold of the receiver is considered an indicator of retaliation and tolerance
level [29]. An alternative interpretation is that the threshold values are an indicator of fairness up to a
certain level of threshold [23]. In our model, we included the receivers’ threshold of the UG exercise as
the dependent variable in a Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) model.
2.2.2. Collecting Socio-Economic Household Data
The IRRI collected agricultural and socioeconomic variables using household surveys conducted
from 2009 to 2010. Based on this data set, we matched socio-economic and agricultural data
from 131 beneficiaries and 114 non-beneficiaries in the study area who participated in behavioral
experiments. We included socio-economic as well as household characteristic variables in our
model—such as age, schooling years, asset holdings, household size, gender and female ratio—to
account for the effects of these factors, as these variables are often associated with degree of
social capital [31–33] and are found to critically determine the cooperation scale in the previous
literature [31,34,35]. While Berg et al. [26] proposes the consideration of ethnic heterogeneity in villages,
we chose not to include ethnicity, language, and religion because those are nearly homogenous in
our study site. Since it is vital to incorporate the geographical location of farmers to understand
their social capital, we also compiled the GPS locations of households to the data set. The average
distance between neighboring farmers was 2.48 km, with a standard deviation of 1.94 km. The distance
from a farmer to a neighboring farmer among the beneficiaries (mean = 2.78 km) and among the
non-beneficiaries (mean = 2.24 km) was statistically significantly different according to the t-test (p < 0.05).
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the demographic variables. The respondents were mainly
head of the household, male, and were, on average, approximately 51 years old. Average schooling
years was equivalent to the time needed to complete elementary school according to the Philippine
education system.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the respondents’ demographic information for non-beneficiaries
and beneficiaries.
Respondents Number ofObservations
Average Age
(Std. Dev)
Average Schooling
Years (Std. Dev)
% of Female
Participants
Marriage
Rate (%)
Literacy
Rate (%)
Total 245 51.2 (12.2) 6.3 (3.0) 29.0 91 98
Non-beneficiaries 114 53.0 (11.9) 6.6 (3.2) 34.2 89 96
Beneficiaries 131 49.6 (12.2) 6.1 (2.9) 24.4 91 100
The beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the irrigation scheme do not have significant differences
in their demographic statistics. Based on the independent sample t-test, no significant differences in
marital status (p = 0.571), education level (p = 0.155), or gender ratio (p = 0.093) were found at the
5% statistical significance level. Even though age (p = 0.032) differed statistically between the two
groups, the magnitude of the difference was not large (1.8 years). It is not surprising that the two
groups were similar, since the two study areas were adjacent to each other, and the selection into the
irrigation scheme was at random. Furthermore, our interviews confirmed that the irrigation system
project had not caused existing residents to relocate until the time of the experiment, and that the basic
demographic status had not changed after the irrigation project.
Household-level characteristics showed small differences between the beneficiaries and
non-beneficiaries, except for asset holdings (Table 2). The non-beneficiaries had larger assets than the
beneficiaries. We checked income sources and found that, for the beneficiaries, 56% of the income
came from agriculture while 34% of income for the non-beneficiaries relied on agriculture. According
to the semi-structured interviews, off-farm income sources were from short-term businesses and daily
piecework. It may be the case that the irrigation beneficiaries began to reduce their engagement in
off-farm activities as a result of increased reliability in agricultural production and reallocated their
assets into consumption and investment activities. Examining the correlation between the control
variables, none of the correlation coefficients exceeded 0.35 in absolute terms, leading us to assume
that there was no high multicollinearity in our regressions. A negative correlation was found between
age and schooling years, reflecting the fact that the public education program was in the process of
improvement during the study period.
Table 2. Family composition and assets of the sampled households for non-beneficiaries and beneficiaries.
Respondents Number ofObservations
Average Number of Household
Members (Std. Dev)
Average Female
Ratio (Std. Dev)
Average Asset
Holding (PhP)
Total 245 5.9 (2.3) 0.5 (0.2) 63,775
Non-beneficiaries 114 5.7 (2.3) 0.5 (0.2) 71,145
Beneficiaries 131 6.2 (2.3) 0.5 (0.1) 56,613
Note: The exchange rate was USD 1 = PhP 43.7 as of 2010.
2.2.3. Semi-Structured Interviews
To understand the local context of social behavior, our research group conducted semi-structured
interviews during two site visits, once in December 2012 and another in March 2013. We interviewed
eight farmers during each visit. These semi-structured interviews were intended to understand
the residents’ involvement in the irrigation project, including: (1) planning; (2) construction; and
(3) management. We conducted interviews with local staff of IRRI. The trained research team also
contacted residents with TSA leaders and asked the following questions: (1) Are there any conflicts
with the planning, construction, and management of the irrigation scheme; (2) what is the major role of
TSA; and (3) are there any special programs in TSA groups to join other than participating in scheduled
irrigation? By using these questions as a framework, we conducted 10–15 min semi-structured
interviews. These interviews were recorded and participants remained anonymous. The interviews
were conducted in both English and Cebuano. Since this paper focused on the statistical analysis and
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measurement of social capital, we used the information collected from these interviews as a qualitative
supplement to the quantitative analysis.
2.2.4. Spatial Autoregressive (SAR) Model
While ANOVA and a-spatial regressions, including ordinary least squares (OLS), are commonly
performed in quantitative assessments and factor analysis, care must be taken when the variables
of interest are likely to be spatially correlated, particularly with the dependent variable. The degree
of individual-level social capital can depend partly on the geographical distance between holders of
differing levels of social capital, as distance can foster relationships and communication [36]. Since the
spatial correlation in important variables may lead to bias in estimated coefficients in the estimation [37],
we employed the spatial autoregressive (SAR) model to control for such possible bias and, at the same
time, to explicitly capture the endogenous social effects of the dependent variable, which reflected
social interactions between individuals. Moreover, the explicit incorporation of spatial dependence
in the error term enabled us to control for unobservable factors correlated within the community
that could affect the outcome, which can be confounded with the actual endogenous spillover effect.
Correlated effects, as opposed to endogenous effects, can absorb a possible self-selection bias as well,
which is a remarkable advantage of using the SAR model framework.
As the first step, we examined the spatial autocorrelation using the global Moran’s I test statistic,
based on the OLS residual from the regression of the UG result. Moran’s I, expressed as Equation (1),
takes a value between −1 and 1, where a positive (or negative) value indicates positive (or negative)
autocorrelation in the dependent variable:
I =
N∑ni=1∑
n
j=1 Wij
(
Yi −Y
)(
Yj −Y
)
(∑ni=1∑
n
j=1 Wij)∑
n
i=1
(
Yi −Y
)2 , (1)
where N is the total sample size of participants, Yi and Yj indicate the result of the UG for individuals I
and j, respectively, Y is the UG sample average, and Wij is the i-j element of the weight matrix W.
The weight matrix (Wij) that we utilized is of a distance decay function, which takes into account
the effect of spatial interaction diminished by distance. First, the inverse distance is assigned to each
element of the weight matrix as in Equation (2):
Wij =
1
dij
, (2)
where dij indicates the distance between i and j. This function accounts for the common characteristics
of nearby individuals’ social capital: i.e., increased distance between individuals is expected to weaken
their social relationships [36]. The matrix elements are then row-standardized so that the sum of all
elements in every row is unified.
If the Moran’s I test on spatial autocorrelation is significant, the SAR model must be established.
The major choices under the SAR framework are the Spatial Lag Model (SLM), the Spatial Error Model
(SEM), and a combination of the two (the ARAR model). Using the weight matrices, the ARAR model
is expressed as follows:
Y = ρW1Y+ Xβ+ µ , (3)
µ = λW2µ+  , (4)
where the first term on the right-hand side of Equation (3) represents the spatial lag effect, while the
first term on the right-hand side of Equation (4) accounts for the spatial correlation in unobserved
factors. The weight matrices W1 and W2 can be either the same or different depending on how one
defines the spatial process.
When the coefficient λ is statistically insignificant, the ARAR Model reduces to the SLM as follows:
Water 2017, 9, 202 8 of 15
Y = ρWY+ Xβ+  , (5)
This is a structural form with the endogenous term on the right-hand side. When rearranging
Equation (5) by moving the endogenous term ρWY, we obtain the reduced form:
Y = (I− ρW)−1Xβ+ (I− ρW)−1 , (6)
where, in this sequence, the coefficient (I − ρW)−1 indicates that the coefficient β is not equal to the
marginal effects of X when the coefficient ρ is statistically significant. The coefficient ρ captures the
endogenous social effect, which is the mutual influence in Y between the neighboring farmers.
By contrast, when ρ is statistically insignificant instead of λ, the ARAR model reduces to the SEM
as follows:
Y = Xβ+ µ , (7)
µ = λWµ+  , (8)
When rearranging Equation (7) by moving λW in Equation (8), we obtain the reduced form:
Y = Xβ+ (I − λW)−1e , (9)
To determine the model specification among SLM, SEM, and the ARAR model, we utilize the
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests for spatial diagnostics, provided that the Moran’s I holds significant.
If the result of the LM test points to SLM, we do not need to model an autocorrelation in the error
term. This means that there are no neighborhood effects arising from unobservable factors, including
selection effects.
Since the reduced form equations are not linear in coefficients, SLM, SEM, and the ARAR model
are estimated by maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) [38], as the use of least squares regressions
would suffer a severe endogeneity bias unless properly treated with valid instrumental variables (IV).
A prime example of successful least squares estimation is the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation
conducted by Bramoullé et al. [39] in which higher-degree neighbors were adopted for identifying
instruments of which the validity is assured by the test for necessary and sufficient conditions for
identification. Recently, the feat by Bramoullé et al. [39] was followed by Krishnan and Patnam [40],
who study farmer-to-farmer technology dissemination in Ethiopia using IV. Another viable method
is generalized methods of moments (GMM), which was suggested by Lee [41]. The GMM was
further developed by Lin and Lee [42] and Elhorst [43] in their discussion of these various methods’
pros and cons.
In analysis, we tried some different combinations of the control variables for robustness of the
estimations. To assess the global fit of the models, we consider Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) [44]:
AIC = −2× loglikelihood + 2× K, (10)
where K is the number of parameters in the equation. Obviously, the smaller the AIC is, the better the
fit becomes.
3. Results
3.1. Ultimatum Game
The beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the irrigation project have clear differentiating results
in the UG (Table 3 and Figure 3). The beneficiaries (25.12 PhP) exhibited lower mean threshold values
in UG results compared to the non-beneficiaries (34.47 PhP). The difference was supported by the
t-test (p < 0.001). Previous knowledge is that participants from smaller-scale societies exhibit lower
values in UG results because they are more inclined to consider tolerance than retaliation or economic
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payoff [45]. Likewise, the irrigated communities (i.e., a TSA of twenty or more farmers) in our study
also exhibited pro-social behavior. A more formal estimation was performed by SAR analysis.
Table 3. Results for the Ultimatum Game (UG) experiment and the difference between beneficiaries
and non-beneficiaries.
Statistic Beneficiaries Non-Beneficiaries t-Test |(1)− (2)|
Average (Std. Dev) 25.12 (16.47) 34.47 (21.29) 9.36 t(212) = 3.81, p < 0.001
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Moran’s I plot.
The barangay average values of the UG results plotted on the map exhibited the different patterns
of UG results across the study area (Figure 3). While the beneficiaries have homogenous patterns of
lower UG results, the non-beneficiaries hold heterogeneous patterns of higher UG results.
3.2. SAR Estimation
The global Moran’s I statistic with the UG results was 0.168, and its p-value was less than 0.001,
which suggested a positive spatial autocorrelation in the level of UG results. The result of the LM tests
(90% significance level) suggested SLM as the appropriate spatial model, meaning that the spatial
autocorrelation did not stem from the spatial correlation in unobserved factors. Moreover, our weight
matrice assed the test for necessary and sufficient conditions for identification of social effects,
propos d by Bramoullé et al. [39], which assures satisfaction of the conditions needed to avoid the
reflection problem elaborat d upon by Manski [46].
Table 4 presents the results of the SLM estimations. While the OLS model (1) indicates that both
irrigation and assets have statistically significa t impacts on the UG results, the Moran’s I and the LM
test imply that further spatial analysis is necessary. Model (2) reveals the statistically significant and
positive endogenous spatial effect (ρ) after controlling for individual (i.e., age, gender, and education)
and household (i.e., asset holdings, the number of household members, and female ratio) characteristics.
Hence, model (2) suggests that the individuals’ level of social capital, as measured by the UG receivers’
threshold, was linked with the level of social capital of their neighbors. The endogenous spatial effect
also implies that the coefficients of the control variables may have suffered bias if spatial models had
not been employed.
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Table 4. Results of the Spatial Lag Model (SLM) regressions of the Ultimatum Game (UG) results on
the spatial spillover effect and individual/household characteristics. Dependent variable: UG results
(receiver’s threshold).
Category Independent Variable (1) OLS (2) SLM All (3) SLMBeneficiaries
(4) SLM
Non-Beneficiaries
Endogenous spatial effect (ρ) - 0.243 **(0.086)
0.213 *
(0.114)
0.122
(0.142)
Individual
characteristics
Age 0.043 0.063 0.272 ** −0.302
(0.109) (0.105) (0.109) (0.194)
Gender
1.047 0.37 4.051 −5.181
(2.715) (2.621) (2.970) (4.263)
Education
−0.258 −0.227 0.258 −1.066
(0.449) (0.433) (0.482) (0.725)
Household
characteristics
Irrigation −10.37 *** −7.697 ** - -
(2.497) (2.504)
Asset holding (ln) −3.152 *** −3.066 ** −5.289 ** 1.433
(1.132) (1.093) (1.116) (2.032)
Number of household
members
−0.073 −0.048 −0.076 −0.566
(0.532) (0.514) (0.540) (0.914)
Female ratio
2.199 0.97 12.225 −6.848
(7.564) (7.304) (8.834) (11.284)
Intercept - 66.373 ** 56.415 ** 51.235 ** 47.949 **
(14.269) (14.140) (15.087) (23.920)
Goodness of fit
AIC 2140 2135 1087 1032
Log likelihood −1087.9 −1057.6 −534.4 −507.0
Notes: OLS: ordinary least squares. N = 245 in Model (1) and (2); N = 131 in Model (3); N = 114 in Model (4);
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
To scrutinize the differences between the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, we divided the
sample and built two models: (3) and (4). Comparing the endogenous spatial effect (ρ) in models (3)
and (4), the results indicate that only the beneficiaries had a spatial spillover effect on the formation of
social capital. Given the heterogeneous patterns of the barangay-level UG results in Figure 3 and the
absence of a management community (i.e., IA and TSA) in the rainfed area, the lack of endogenous
spatial effect is plausible in the rainfed area (non-beneficiaries).
In models (1), (2) and (3), the individual characteristics variables (gender, age, and schooling
years), as well as the family size and female ratio did not exhibit statistically significant effects. On the
other hand, access to the irrigation system, asset holdings, and neighbors’ social capital had significant
effects on the UG results on the whole. According to model (2), one unit increase in the neighbors’ UG
results leads to a 0.243 unit increase in the UG results on average. In relation to our hypothesis, the
coefficient of access to the irrigation system is −7.697, which represents a direct negative effect from
irrigation on the indicator of retaliatory behavior. Using the spatial multiplier (1− ρ)−1 = 1.321 for
the averaged total effect, the incorporation of the indirect effect through the neighbors’ dependent
variable resulted in (1− ρ)−1β1 = −10.168. That is, when the non-beneficiaries received the irrigation
system, their measured level of retaliatory behavior would decrease by 10.168 units on average,
holding the covariates constant. The result clearly suggests that the collective action required in
gravity irrigation management enhances pro-social behavior among the beneficiaries. The significant
coefficient of asset holdings indicates that a 1% increase in asset value was associated with a change
in the UG results by (1− ρ)−1β2 = −4.0502 units on average. This decrease suggests that wealthier
residents tended to act in a more tolerant manner, which is consistent with previous research [11,45].
Even though the beneficiaries possessed lower amounts of assets than the non-beneficiaries (Table 2),
which negatively affect the level of social capital, access to the irrigation system compensated for that
loss to a large extent.
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4. Discussion
4.1. The Irrigation Scheme and Social Capital
This study explored the social impact exhibited by access to irrigation in order to provide insight
into how local development projects affect social capital. We found lower values in the UG results
among the beneficiaries than among the non-beneficiaries, which suggests that the beneficiaries tended
to tolerate unequal distribution more than the non-beneficiaries (Tables 3 and 4). The results concluded
that the irrigation management scheme (both IA and TSA) played a key role in the development of
social capital in the study area. In this behavioral experiment, actual payoff was at stake, in line with
the real life incentive structures. Hence, people who have stronger ties within a small-scale society
should exhibit greater tolerance in view of the ongoing social obligation [45,47].
Further analysis was conducted with the SAR model to control for the spillover of social capital as
well as the unobservable effects within the neighborhood. Negative effects of the irrigation intervention
were found on the result of UG (Table 4.), which is equivalent to the positive effects on the levels of
tolerating behavior as one form of social capital. Large asset holders also tended to exhibit a higher
level of pro-social behavior, suggesting a social capital growth associated with the enhancement of
social status. Moreover, we found a spatial spillover effect of social behavior through the estimation of
the SAR model: i.e., a close neighbor’s social behavior influences that of the individual. The implication
of the results is that both high and low levels of social capital spilled over to close neighbors.
4.2. Irrigation Management Communities and Social Capital
Since the irrigation organizations (both IA and TSA) were formed based on their geographical
location, the required collective management in the irrigation scheme likely induced the formation of
social capital within the TSA and IA. Therefore, the suggested impact of the local development scheme
can be further understood by recognizing the social interactions necessitated among the beneficiaries.
Comparison of the endogenous spatial effect (ρ) between models (3) and (4) (Table 4.) substantiated this
situation as well, as rainfed farmers (non-beneficiaries) did not have a spillover effect on the UG results.
This implies that social capital was influenced by an active participation in community practices (i.e.,
with irrigation organizations in this study). The newly structured agricultural communities (IA and
TSA) were unique and had not existed in the region before. This change was vital to improving the
beneficiaries’ sense of belonging to the community in comparison to the non-beneficiaries who were
not involved in the irrigation project.
Furthermore, as Kuper et al. [48] stated, participation in and contribution to community-level
activities are crucial in development procedures that require semi-autonomous management. The TSA
structure allows us to deduce implications in this regard. According to our qualitative interviews with
the respondents, through collective management processes, individual farmers voluntarily repaired
sub-lateral canals and grouped themselves together to purchase agricultural machinery and offer a
micro-credit scheme for mutual help within the community. Simultaneously, the NIA reimbursed 50%
of canal maintenance costs to TSA members, which was utilized as a fund to implement community
activities. The TSA structure has triggered community activity never seen before. Community
involvement—in this case, water governance—enhanced the effective and concerted use of the
community’s limited common resources [14,49–51].
4.3. Irrigation Project and Agrarian Future
During the field interviews, we identified a larger sense of community among the beneficiaries
than among the non-beneficiaries. The interviewees commonly mentioned “future of our
neighborhoods” and their common goals for upcoming cultivation periods. Although we cannot fully
prove these facts with the limitation in time-series data, we could emphasize the power of social capital
accumulation within communities. Likewise, as Putnam [6] states, a deep bond within a community
can foster regional economic success. Since the majority of the residents in our study site had yet to
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secure a stable income, the irrigation scheme, as well as the civic engagement within the restructured
communities, are expected to improve stability in agricultural production and make a remarkable
difference in the residents’ welfare.
Another vital observation is that farmers employed in the irrigation construction process
voluntarily laid concrete into the sub-lateral canals and used their existing construction knowledge.
Those with skills in advanced technology freely shared this knowledge with fellow farmers. In addition,
this success story encouraged farmers to adopt innovative technology. Various farmers in the
beneficiaries’ area have been designated as model farmers under the Department of Agriculture
(DA) program in their production of hybrid rice, which contributed to the improvement in agricultural
productivity within a short period. During an interview, the leader of TSA 14 reported “I am quite
optimistic about the future of Bohol agriculture and also want my three sons, who are studying
crop science, veterinary, and agronomy in colleges, to stay and work in Bohol”. This brief statement
symbolizes the positive outlook and attitude of having a career as a farmer when given access to the
irrigation system.
4.4. Limitation
Three main limitations exist in our study. First, our UG results cannot be over-generalized.
Since UG results can vary depending on the local and regional contexts, it requires discretion to
directly apply our finding to other sites. Thus, we limited the interpretation of the UG results to
a small-scale society, where reputation is considered important relative to their economic reward.
It must be noted, however, that the UG results can be interpreted differently, where a high level of
retaliatory behavior may be evidence of social norms and fairness that support cooperation. Hence,
careful consideration must be exercised when applying our results into another context. Second, as
DeFilippis [52] argued, there is some limitation in measurements of social capital through behavioral
experiments. Artefactual experiments typically rely on monetary values as units of measurement,
which implies that the result could be influenced by unobservable individual characteristics associated
with monetary management or the ability to conduct arithmetic. Third, this study employed an
unplanned consequential experiment, where beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries were randomly
selected within a certain range of the project site. This means that we can assume that the two
groups shared similar socio-economic and cultural characteristics prior to the experiment. In principle,
however, it would have been ideal if there had been a baseline study in advance of the intervention,
so that we could utilize the Difference-in-Difference (DID) type of estimator to explicitly control for
the ex-ante status of social capital. In this respect, we admit that this study is not conducive to a
formal assessment of the impact of the treatment (i.e., irrigation scheme) on the outcome (i.e., social
capital). In summary, our findings rely on the three items: (1) the interpretation of tolerance that
corresponds to small-scale societies formulated by collective irrigation management; (2) the fact that
the intervention was conducted in a non-selective, way as noted in the introduction; and (3) the spatial
econometric framework that can account for a possible selection bias resulting from spatial correlation
of unobservable factors.
5. Conclusions
We summarize our conclusion as follows: (1) local development projects with agricultural
community engagement can not only enhance agricultural productivity but also social relationships
among the beneficiary farmers; (2) these enhanced social relationships and accumulated social
capitals are vital mechanisms that give rise to enhanced pro-social behavior among farmers; and
(3) local development projects with civic engagement may strengthen management and cooperation
by involving stakeholders as key players in the projects—which fosters agricultural productivity and
social capital simultaneously.
These points can be significantly applied to local development projects in the global south, which have
implemented economic development plans through agricultural infrastructure (e.g., irrigation scheme).
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Since many of these projects were planned by the central government and multinational agencies,
maintenance issues followed after management roles were transferred to the local government [53].
Civic engagement, however, involves local stakeholders as key players in local development projects
and offers a plausible solution when the local government is incapable of adequate project maintenance.
While further specifications for policy development are needed, we tentatively conclude that civic
engagement—a platform for accumulating social capital and developing pro-social behaviors—is key
to successful local development projects.
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